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Natural Law: Voegelin and The End of [Legal]
Philosophy
Patrick H. Martin*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a natural law philosophy? Having edited (with George
Christie) a Jurisprudence casebook that contains several examples of
natural law writings,' I was confident that I knew the answer to this.
Indeed, I thought that there was general agreement as to what would
be counted as a natural law philosophy. The reaction to a paper on
Eric Voegelin I prepared for a session at the 2001 meeting of the
American Political Science Association made clear to me that
labeling a scholar as part of the natural law tradition is more
controversial than I had thought. The message to me seemed to be
that friends do not call friends natural law lawyers, validating Ronald
Dworkin's observation that "one label is particularly dreaded: no one
wants to be called a natural lawyer."2 Several who knew him have
told me that Voegelin himself rejected the classification for his
writing, although he spoke of circumstances in which "natural law
has theoretical justification." In revising that paper on Voegelin for
publication, I have thought it best to begin with what I mean by a
natural law philosophy. If others disagree that Voegelin is a natural
law philosopher, they may similarly take up the general concept of a
natural law philosophy.
Writers who locate themselves in, or who are sympathetic to,
natural law theory treat natural law as correlated with human nature
and a manifestation of order in the world, and as consisting of
standards, principles or precepts that will attain goods or ends that are
essential to or may facilitate human happiness. John M. Finnis has
described natural law as "moral standards which.., can justify and
guide political authority, make legal rules rationally binding, and
shape concept formation in even descriptive social theory."' 3 He treats
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. George C. Christie & Patrick H. Martin, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings
on the Philosophy of Law (1995) [hereinafter Christie & Martin].
2. Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 165
(1982), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/classes/rwamer/justice/syllabus/
dwnatural.html (last modified Feb. 18, 1999).
3. Oxford Companion to Philosophy 606-07 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
Finnis' much less summary account of natural law theory is discussed in Natural
Law and Natural Rights (1980) [hereinafter Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
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the phrase "natural law" as referring to "true and valid standards of
right conduct," and notes that this war of speaking about such
standards can be traced back to Plato. In natural law theory's
seventeenth and eighteenth century appearance, "morality and the
law's basic principles are a matter of 'conformity to rational
nature." 5 A more valid understanding, according to Finnis, is to be
found in the classic theories of natural law, which understands the
correlation between natural law and human nature as running in
both directions: human nature can only be adequately understood by
understanding human capacities, which in turn can be understood
adequately only by understanding the acts that actualize them,
which in turn can only be understood adequately by reference to
their "objects"--the goods the acting person intends to attain by
means of such acts.
The attainment of ends through rational principles of conduct is
found also in Randy Barnett's Law Professor's Guide to Natural
Law and Natural Rights.' Barnett analogizes natural law to an end
or "given" achieved through "if-then" propositions in relation to
physical laws, such as the law of gravity: because of the force of
gravity, "if we want a building that will enable persons to live or
work inside it, then we need to provide a foundation, walls, and roof
of a certain strength."7 To illustrate further, he says, "[i]f we want
persons to be able to pursue happiness while living in society with
each other, then they had best adopt and respect a social structure
that reflects these principles."'  He summarizes the matter by
stating:
Natural law refers to the given-if-then method of analysis
where the "given" is the nature of human beings and the
world in which they live. This method can be applied to a
number of distinct problems, the "if." When discussing
moral virtues and vices, or the problem of distinguishing
good from bad behavior, the imperative for which is
supposedly based on human nature, natural-law ethics is the
appropriate term (though such principles are sometimes
referred to simply as natural law).'
Rights]. See also 2 John M. Finnis, Natural Law (The International Library of
Essays in Law & Legal Theory) (John M. Finnis ed., 1991).
4. John M. Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Theory, in The Oxford
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 3 (2002).
5. Id. at 5.
6. 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 655 (1997).
7. Id. at 656.
8. Id. at 657.
9. Id. at 680.
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Ronald Dworkin gives what he calls a "crude description" of
natural law: "Natural law insists that what the law is depends in some
way on what the law should be."'"
In the earlier instances of natural law theory, God tended to be at
the forefront of the theory, either acting by His command or through
the fact that He was co-extensive with Reason. Human nature
derived its character from the fact it was created by God with
purpose. Many natural law theorists have felt that logic compels the
belief that order does not establish itself, that it must be established.
Aristotle, who is often considered in the natural law tradition, admits
the logical necessity of a First Mover." In more recent versions,
God's presence is more likely to be less visible or unseen though
perhaps felt, and human nature closer to the front. Jean Dabin, for
example, maintained it is possible to regard the natural order as
flowing from human nature: "As human nature is identical in all men
and does not vary, its precepts have universal and immutable validity,
notwithstanding the diversity of individual conditions, historical and
geographical environments, civilizations and cultures."' 2
Critics of natural law theory (or theories) tend to characterize
natural law in ways that make natural law distinctly unattractive and
inconsistent. A persistent approach treats natural theory as a sort of
statute book or tablet. The entry by Richard Wollheim for "Natural
Law" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins by asserting that it
seems an "intrinsic part" of natural law "doctrine" that,
the criterion by reference to which positive laws are to be
judged should itself possess some of the characteristics of a
legal code. In particular, it should exhibit some complexity
or be capable of formulation as a comparatively extended set
of rules or precepts, against which existing codes can then be
matched item by item. "a
Such a natural code, naturally, would be static-written in stone, as
it were, and incapable of adapting to new human conditions. Can one
find a single well-regarded writer in a natural law tradition who
actually posits such a set of rules (as opposed to standards aimed at
.10. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 165. He distances himself from natural law
theory by adding, "This seems metaphysical or at least vaguely religious. In any
case it seems plainly wrong." Id.
11. Aristotle, Metaphysics Book IV, at 207 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1968).
12. Jean Dabin, General Theory of Law, in The Legal Philosophies of Lask,
Radbruch and Dabin 420 (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. ed. & Kurt Wilk trans., 1950).
13. Richard Wollheim, Natural Law, in 5 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 450-51(Paul Edwards trans., 1967) [hereinafter Wollheim].
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the attainment of human ends or goods)? 4 A concept of "natural law
with variable content" seems hopelessly incoherent to a critic who
sees law simply as sets of rules-commands.
The stone-tablet model has persisted as a supposed theory of
natural law, albeit lacking a principal exponent, and it is this model
from which Voegelin sought to distance himself. In the outline and
supplementary notes for the Jurisprudence course he taught at LSU,
Voegelin made clear that one theory of natural law system was
defensible, but the more rigid versions were not. He wrote:
Natural law has theoretical justification insofar as it translates
the insights gained by a theory of the nature of man into the
language of obligatory purposes ... Natural law becomes
dubious if it erects theoretically justified, paradigmatic rules
of order into postulates of revolutionary reform... Natural
law is worthless if it contains no more than partisan
preferences without a basis in a critical theory of the nature of
man.
15
Separating natural law theory from its caricatures, we should then
regard Voegelin's theory of law as falling in the natural law tradition
if it posits the existence of a natural order (perhaps established by
God), that can be known to men and that can be a measure for
assessing human or positive law. Voegelin himself would have
accepted this criterion while resisting the label.
II. VOEGELIN'S MANUSCRIPT
Eric Voegelin taught a course in Jurisprudence at the LSU Law
Center for several years while he was a member of the Political
14. Wollheim's essay in Natural Law, supra note 13, presents as the "basic
texts of natural-law theory": Cicero, De'Re Publica De Legibus (Clinton W. Keyes
trans., 1977); 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Dominican Province trans.,
Christian Classics ed., 1981) (1271); Francisco Suirez, De Legibus, Ac Deo
Legislatore (Carnegie Classics 1944) (1612); Samuel von Pufendorf, De Jure
Naturae et Gentium (Carnegie ed., 1934) (1688); John Locke, Essays on the Law
of Nature (W. Von Leyden ed. 1954); Rudolf Stanuler, A Theory of Justice (Isaac
Husik trans., 1925); and Readings in Jurisprudence (Jerome Hall ed., 1938). Not
one of these writers can remotely be accused of suggesting a natural law approach
"being capable of formulation as a comparatively extended set of rules or precepts,
against which existing codes can then be matched item by item." See Wollheim,
supra note 13, at 450-5 1.
15. Eric Voegelin, The Nature of the Law 81-82 (Robert A. Pascal et. al. eds.,
1991) [hereinafter Voegelin]. In the supplementary notes, Voegelin treats as
natural law "all attempts at transforming a reaction toward injustice experienced
in the concrete case into a body of fundamental, substantive rules which claim
authority as expressing the true nature of man and society." Id. at 80.
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Science Faculty of the University. He completed a manuscript on
The Nature of the Law in 1957. Edited by Robert Pascal, James Lee
Babin, and John William Corrington, the manuscript was published,
along with several other Voegelin writings, in 1991 as Volume 27 of
The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. Voegelin deserves close
study by any student of the subject of natural law and by any person
interested in Voegelin's thought. The book is little but weighty, and
its value lies in its critique of a century or more of legal positivism as
well as its explicit premises that point the way for a more fully
realized development of natural law theory, such as we find in John
Finnis's 1980 Natural Law and Natural Rights. 7
With this title I hope to reflect several themes in Voegelin's
approach to law and Twentieth Century thought. The word "end"
signifies the notion of purpose or goal which also equates to
Aristotle's belief in "final cause," telos or finis. Aristotle's four
causes are familiar: the material, efficient, formal, and final cause. A
failing of the reigning approach in contemporary legal philosophy,
positivist, normative jurisprudence was, in Voegelin's opinion, to
equate "law" with the process of law making. Using Kelsen's "Pure
Theory" as a representative case of normative jurisprudence,
Voegelin said: "the lawmaking process acquires the monopoly of the
title 'law.""' 8 In the view which he criticizes, the sole criteria for
legal analysis is the process for making law: "whatever power
establishes itself effectively in a society is the lawmaking power, and
whatever rules it makes are the law.",
The final end, purpose or cause of a thing is its reason for being.
Voegelin's Nature ofLaw is concerned not with mere analysis of law
as to form or content but purpose in the life of man. Law's nature is
not verbal construction, i.e., command of a sovereign backed by
sanction, nor a substantive collection of rules of contract or property.
Rather, its nature is associated with the philosophy of man's being.
[Legal] I place in brackets to reflect Voegelin's belief that legal
philosophy is not distinct from other aspects of philosophy:
The relations among human beings in a society, thus, to a
large extent have legal structure. The legal character of social
reality, however, is even more pervasive than it appears to be
if we consider nothing more than the specific rules created by
members of the society for themselves.2"
16. 27 The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin (1991).
17. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3.
18. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 28.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 23.
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He follows this up with his broader reflection that contemporary
use of the word law is inadequate to convey a proper concept of
law:
[T]he equivocal use of "the law" in the sense of valid rules
made by organs of government and "the law" that somehow
pervades the existence of man in society. What is preserved
in this pale equivocation of our everyday language is the
profound insight, rarely to be found in contemporary legal
theory, that "the law" is the substance of order in all realms
of being.2
Law's nature is seen in Voegelin's careful choice of words to
describe certain aspects of law's elements. Commenting on Plato
and Aristotle, he states:
The inquiry into the true order of the polis is the
philosopher's principal task. Specific rules are formulated
under the aspect that they articulate the true order in society
and, if enacted, will secure it. The lawmaking process is
studied under the aspect whether its organization will result
in rules that will secure the true order.22
Specific rules do not make the order of society; rather they
articulate the true order. When enacted they are not the order. of
society; rather, they are a means of securing the true order.
The secondary implication of my use of "end" in association
with Voegelin's work is to suggest downfall or disintegration, a
coming to an end-a theme that he returns to several times in The
Nature of Law. In Voegelin's view, legal thought and philosophy
were in poor shape in the Western thought of his and our time:
"with the progress of secularism and the disintegration of
philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the lawmaking
process achieves complete autonomy, i.e., its theorists remove from
legal theory the question of substantive order. '23 He speaks of the
"state of philosophical disintegration that is manifest in normative
jurisprudence. Or again: "While the intention of the rule is not
cognitive, the rule nevertheless intends a truth. That is the point
perhaps most difficult to understand in the contemporary state of
philosophical disintegration."25 Elsewhere, Voegelin spoke even
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 29.
25. Id. at 65.
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more strongly of the times, saying that "the insane have succeeded
in locking the sane in the asylum . . . the political tentacles of
scientistic civilization reach into every nook and comer of
industrialized society.
26
Is there not an inconsistency in a philosophy that posits the
existence of an order in society that is reflected in law while at the
same time decrying the disintegration of that philosophical order? I
would argue that it is not. The conservative can be an optimist. The
optimistic conservative has faith in the wondrous nature of the human
being even while lamenting the state of the present population and
polity of humans; the natural order is the possible or potential order,
not necessarily the present order.
III. VOEGELINIAN THEMES
A. Nature
We may begin with a consideration of the word "nature" from the
book's title. In ordinary use, as reflected in the American Heritage
Dictionary, it refers to the "intrinsic character of a person or a
thing."'2" The Oxford English Dictionary defines nature as "[t]he
essential qualities or properties of a thing; the inherent and
inseparable combination of properties essentially pertaining to
anything and giving it its fundamental character."2  When we, and
Voegelin, refer to the "nature" of the law, we are looking to its
intrinsic character, its essential qualities or properties. Voegelin
identifies the use of "nature" as having the same meaning for
Aristotle as "form" on occasion, though he notes an inconsistency in
usage by Aristotle.29 At the outset of his book, Voegelin raises the
possibility:
[T]hat perhaps the law does not have a nature. And since the
only reason for a thing not to have a nature is its lack of
ontological status-the fact that it is not a self-contained,
concrete thing in any realm of being-there arises the
unpleasant question whether the law exists.3 0
His focus then is on the "ontological status" of "the law," whether
law has real existence. Nature also refers to the "order, disposition,
26. Lee C. McDonald, Voegelin and the Positivists: A New Science of
Politics?, 1 Midwest J. of Pol. Science 233, 241 (1957).
27. American Heritage Dictionary 875 (New College ed., 1976).
28. Oxford English Dictionary (CD-ROM ed., 1993).
29. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 41.
30. Id. at 6.
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and essence of all entities composing the physical universe."' 31 If we
were to engage in Voegelin's predilection for playful turning words
back upon themselves, we would summarize his view by saying: For
Voegelin, the nature of law is in the law of nature.
B. Human nature
Human nature is of considerable importance in Voegelin's
schema of law. Where Voegelin is unacceptable to contemporary
legal thought is precisely where he is most Aristotelian-his view of
law proceeds from a belief in "human nature." It is that nature of
man, his Logos, that is the center of social order, political science,
and we may assume also, law. The telling verb that he uses reveals
much: "unfold." As he discusses Aristotle, he provides his view of
law:
The nature of human community unfolds fully in the polis
because it provides the social environment for the full
unfolding of human nature:
"The inquiry into the true order of society,
regardless of the question whether the surrounding
society is a suitable field for its realization,
develops, in the classic philosophers, into an
autonomous occupation of the human mind-an
enterprise that can be successful only because the
true order of society is the order in which man can
unfold fully the potentialities of his nature. The
nature of man, his Logos, becomes the central
theme of a science of social order; the science of
human nature, philosophical anthropology,
becomes the centerpiece of political science; and
the nature of man, as it unfolds in the existence of
the philosopher, as well as in the disordered
human existence of the surrounding society,
becomes the empirical material for the inquiry. 32
The Aristotelian point of view is seen also in his borrowing of the
term: the bios theoretikos. "Aristotle insisted that a society was
ordered truly only when it made possible the bios theoretikos"--"the
contemplative life" as Voegelin identifies it in the Supplementary
Notes that are reprinted with The Nature of the Law.33 Or again as he
puts it,
31. American Heritage Dictionary 875 (New College ed., 1976)
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 74.
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Natural law has theoretical justification insofar as it translates
the insights gained by a theory of the nature of man into the
language of obligatory purposes. As example may serve the
Aristotelian translation: By theoretical insight the bios
theoretikos is the full unfolding of human potentiality.
Translated into a moral rule: man should strive to find this
fulfillment in his personal existence. Rule of natural justice:
society should be organized in such a manner that the
fulfillment of the purpose is possible, at least for those who
wish to attain it.
34
The end to be attained by law and society is the completion of the
unfolding in the mature man: the spoudaios.3I Although he expresses
it as a conditional form, Voegelin believes "the purpose of human
existence to bring this [human] nature to its full realization.
3 6
Such a view of the nature of man is distinctly at odds with a society
intensely focused on physical pleasure and contemptuous of the idea
that the law or the state has anything to do with the soul. Richard
Posner declares in The Problems of Jurisprudence:
The law is not interested in the soul or even the mind. It has
adopted a severely behaviorist concept of human activity as
sufficient to its ends and tractable to its means. It has yet to be
shown that law changes people's attitudes toward compliance
with social norms, as distinct from altering their incentives.37
In this view, man is little more than ragged claws, responding to
external stimuli; the law is stimulus, using pleasure and pain--or
money (dollar value)!-as incentive. In contrast, Voegelin describes
punishment as having a larger, more complete function:
While punishment, for example, certainly has the function of
protecting the members of a society against the disorganization
of their lives by the disturbing actions of their fellow members,
it also has the purpose of restoring the personal order in the
soul of the delinquent and, as far as that is possible, of
reconstructing him as a person. A utilitarian "philosophy" of
criminal law would obscure the problem that, in the order and
disorder of society, the Ought in the ontological sense is at
stake and that this Ought has its seat in the person of every
single man.31
34. Id. at 81-82.
35. Id. at 74.
36. Id. at 66.
37. Christie & Martin, supra note 1, at 1038.
38. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 64. That such a function is a common feature
20021
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C. Validity
Voegelin uses the term validity in several senses. First is the
straightforward positivist sense, validity as signifying duly enacted.
A law is valid if it has been enacted or promulgated in conformity
with a positive rule, say the Constitution. For example, a statute on
discharges of substances into waters subject to Federal jurisdiction
would be valid if it were approved by a majority of both houses of
Congress and not vetoed by the President. No positivist would find
fault with this use of validity. He expands upon it by observing that
validity comes and goes as statutes are enacted and then repealed.
The law is in part a flowing stream of these rules moving in and out
of validity; a legal order is an aggregate of valid rules. He introduces
the uncertainty over the law's content by recognizing that the law
may not be known until it is declared by a judge in a particular case.
However, Voegelin goes beyond positivism in his use of validity.
For Kelsen, the top of the legal hierarchy was the human-norm-
beyond-which-there-is-no-norm, which he termed the grundnorm orbasic norm. Voegelin seems to approve the construction represented
by Bodin in the sixteenth century in which the hierarchy continues to
God:
The hierarchy of valid rules has as its top stratum the divine
and natural law; under this stratum move the statutes of the
prince; then follows customary law insofar as it is not in
conflict with the royal statutes; next come the decisions of the
magistrates, moving within the law as fixed by the higher
strata; and at the bottom come the legal transactions of the
subjects-their buying and selling, their labor contracts,
marriages, wills, and so forth. The hierarchy of lawmaking
authorities, in reverse order, begins with the subjects, rises
through magistrates and the king, and culminates in God.39
Voegelin's critique of positivism, as positivism was reflected in
Kelsen, is that it cuts off the hierarchy before it reaches its pinnacle.
With the constitutional procedures, however, we have reached the top
of the hierarchy of rules. There is no constitution above the
of a natural law theory is suggested by comparing a similar statement by Finnis:[W]e are bound by our whole analysis of human good to say that one whodefies or contemns the law harms not only others but also himself... The
punitive sanction ought therefore to be adapted so that.., it may work to
restore reasonable personality in the offender, reforming him for the sake
not only of others but of himself: 'to lead a good and useful life.'Christie & Martin, supra note 1, at 212-13.
39. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 27.
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constitution that would link a series of constitutional aggregates
into one legal order in the manner in which the statutory sub-
aggregates are linked by the constitution. We have arrived at the
border at which the problem of validity no longer can be solved
intra-systematically through regress to a procedurally higher
aggregate of rules. We are faced with the phenomenon that the
validity of the law has its origin in extralegal sources.4°
D. Ontological
The term "ontology" has been put to a variety of tasks in
philosophy, principally embracing a concept ofbeing. It has moved
from being a synonym of metaphysics to Christian Wolff s essences
of beings to Kant's analysis of existence to other treatments in
Heidegger and Quine. Voegelin uses "ontological" in a somewhat
special way suggesting to me that he wishes to confirm his belief in
the existence of the thing to which "ontological" attaches, as we
might speak of the ontological object as opposed to the
epistemological object; or perhaps the point at which the Idea is
instantiated (we might think for example of Beauty being
instantiated in a sculpture). Thus, he speaks of "The Ought in the
Ontological Sense."' By this I think he means the "ontological
Ought," the ought that has a genuine existence. And he goes on to
state:
The norms, thus, acquired the character of projects for the
concrete order of society; and at the core of this order we
found the Ought in the ontological sense, the tension in
society that requires the elaborate efforts to create and
maintain the order and, with the order, the very existence of
society.
If now we position ourselves at the ontological center of
the tension, we see that the lawmaking process is only one
among several types of efforts to project and realize the
order of society."'
Observe that he does not speak of the creation or establishment of
order in society but rather theprojection and realization of the order
of society, as earlier we noted he speaks of law as articulating the
true order.
40. Id. at 31. Voegelin goes on to discuss this in a subsection entitled The
Components of Validity.
41. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 42.
42. Id. at 48-49.
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E. The Ought
With this term, we again find a Voegelin adaptation of a word
used in philosophy. He gives it his own special meaning, perhaps.
The classic problem of natural law thought is the difficulty of
moving from "ought" to "is." In Part I, Of Virtue and Vice in
General, of Book III, David Hume makes his well-known
distinction between "is" and "ought." At the end of Section I ofPart I, Book III, where Hume argues that moral distinctions are notderived from reason, and before moving on to argue that they are
also not derived from a moral sense, Hume declares:
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation,
which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every
system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of
a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of
the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not,
expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary
that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall
presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded,
that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems
of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor
is perceiv'd by reason.43
Hume follows Hobbes in the separation of law and morality by
sharply differentiating "is" and "ought;" never do the two meet.
Both writers display another characteristic of legal positivism by
stressing the absolute need for all real things to be found in sense
experience. In this they are empiricists. Empirical or scientific
knowledge is the only genuine form of knowledge. The claimed
existence of a thing beyond sense experience can have no bearing
upon what people accept as real. With Bentham, we see this
43. Christie & Martin, supra note 1, at 475 n.48.
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attitude most pithily expressed in his famous declaration that natural
rights are nonsense, "nonsense on stilts.""
Rejecting these positivists, Voegelin declares the existence of the
Ought. This Ought is the order underlying man's existence. It is
much like the Natural Law for Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae:
QUESTION 91-SECOND ARTICLE
Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are
ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above
(A. 1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the
eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on
them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper
acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is
subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so
far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident
both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the
Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its
proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the
Psalmist after saying (Ps. iv. 6): Offer up the sacrifice of
justice, as though someone asked what the works of justice
are, adds: Many say, Who showeth us good things? In answer
to which question he says: The light of Thy countenance, 0
Lord, is signed upon us: thus implying that the light of natural
reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil,
which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than
an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident
that the natural law is nothing else than the rational
creature's participation of the eternal law. 5
Voegelin takes up the same theme:
Man has the experience of participating, through his
existence, in an order ofbeing that embraces not only himself,
but also God, the world, and society. This is the experience
which can become articulate in the creation of symbols of the
pervasive order of being, such as the previously indicated
Egyptian maat, or Chinese tao, or Greek nomos. He
furthermore experiences the anxiety of the possible fall from
this order of being, with the consequence of his annihilation
in the partnership of being; and, correspondingly, he
experiences an obligation to attune the order of his existence
with the order of being. Finally, he experiences the possible
44. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 Works of Jeremy Bentham
501 (1843).
45. Christie & Martin, supra note 1, at 139.
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fall from, and the attunement with, the order of being as
dependent on his action, that is, he experiences the order of
his own existence as a problem for his freedom and
responsibility. Within the range of society, the realization of
the order of being is experienced as the burden ofman. When
we refer to the "tension" in social order, we envisage this
class of experiences. In order to link them more closely with
the problem of "normativity" in legal rules, we can speak of
them as the Ought in the ontological sense.4 6
One could argue that the cefitral problem ofphilosophy is whether
universals have existence. And here we perhaps get the significance
of Voegelin's phrase, "the Ought in the ontological sense," for we can
append the statement I have just made with Voegelin's phrase: "the
central problem of philosophy is whether universals have existence,
in the ontological sense." Let us take the universal "beauty." Does
"beauty" have a real existence or is the use of the term "beauty"
merely an expression of one's feelings and reflecting no actual quality
of the object prompting the feelings? If I say a painting or a flower
is beautiful, am I describing a quality of the painting or am I merely
describing my own state of mind, an affection rather than a
perception? In the same way, we ask whether just or unjust is
actually a quality of an act or event, or is the use of the term just or
unjust merely a statement of an opinion that is personal or
conventional in that it is shared by a number of persons? If right and
wrong, just and unjust are merely personal and conventional, then we
are free to change our mind, our attitude, about a matter-from say
fear of flying to love of flying. Voegelin would have rejected this.
Whether we think of Voegelin as accepting Plato's universalia
ante rem (before the thing) or Aristotle's universalia in rebus (in
things) Voegelin was a Realist, and a central feature of his legal
thought was the Reality of the Ought: "the Ought is a reality in the
experiences we have outlined." '47
One commentator (on the 2001 program) has observed that The
Nature of the Law does not take up the subject of ethics, with ethics
being concerned with the order of the soul. Perhaps. But I would
offer the proposition that this was neither oversight nor neglect on the
part of Voegelin. Rather, it perhaps reflects his quarrel with
positivism. The positivists and most modem legal scholars would
demand a sharp demarcation of law and morality or law and ethics,
the one binding, the other only a matter of conscience. They do this
to separate law from not-law. And they do this because they often are
exceedingly skeptical about the genuine existence of rules of ethics
46. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 43-44.
47. Id. at 66.
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or morality, indicating instead that expressions of moral principles are
merely expressions of personal liking or disliking.
Hobbes perhaps is the figure who first took us down this path:
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire;
that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object
of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; And of his Contempt, Vile
and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and
Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that
useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so;
nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the
nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the
man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-
wealth), from the Person that representeth it; or from an
Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent
set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.48
For Hobbes the terms just and unjust only signified what the state
had declared just or unjust: "Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust;
nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law."4 As
he also stated: "before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place,
there must be some coercive Power... where there is no Common-
wealth, there nothing is Unjust."5 Is this not identical to saying that
a painting or poem or musical work is beautiful only if the state (or
other authoritative group) declares it to be beautiful or defines the
criteria by which beauty is to be measured?
More recently, we find the words of John Austin, who wrote:
Now, moral obligation is an obligation imposed by opinion,
or an obligation imposed by God: that is, moral obligation is
anything which we choose to call so, for the precepts of
positive morality are infinitely varying, and the will of God,
whether indicated by utility or by a moral sense, is equally
matter of dispute. This decision of Lord Mansfield, which
assumes that the judge is to enforce morality, enables the
judge to enforce just whatever he pleases."
48. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, excerpted in Christie & Martin, supra note 1,
at 402-03. For conflicting interpretations of Hobbes's views on the nature of ethics
and of moral obligation, compare Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of
Hobbes (1957) (especially at 299-329); A. Taylor, The EthicalDoctrine ofHobbes,
in Hobbes Studies 35 (K. Brown ed., 1965) with D. Gauthier, The Logic Of
Leviathan (1969); Stuart Brown, Hobbes: The Taylor Thesis, in Hobbes Studies 57
(K. Brown ed., 1965).
49. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, excerpted in Christie & Martin, supra note 1,
at 441.
50. Id. at 416.
51. Christie & Martin, supra note 1, at 583.
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In this perspective, to separate law and morality (or ethics) is to
separate empirical or positive law, i.e., human law, binding law, from
non-law.
Now the further agenda of the positivists and many modem legal
philosophers is not only to separate law and morality into separate
spheres for analytical purposes and to determine what is binding and
to be applied by judge and jury, but also to say what cannot or should
not become law. Once a subject is identified as a matter only of
morality (and not harm to another person), it is said to be off-limits
to positive law; rather, it should be a matter only of conscience.
For Voegelin, human law and morality draw from the same
underlying source, the true order in which human potential unfolds
and is fulfilled. This is seen in his statement:
[T]he true order of society is the order in which man can
unfold fully the potentialities of his nature. The nature of
man, his Logos, becomes the central theme of a science of
social order; the science of human nature, philosophical
anthropology, becomes the centerpiece of political science;
and the nature of man, as it unfolds in the existence of the
philosopher, as well as in the disordered human existence of
the surrounding society, becomes the empirical material for
the inquiry. The true order of society is living reality in the
well-ordered soul of the philosopher, brought to sharp
consciousness by the philosopher's refusal to succumb to the
disorder of his environment.52
Positivists must still have an organizing principle to provide a
basis for law. They have their own self-evident propositions. For
Hobbes, it was the keeping of Covenant. For John Stuart Mill and
many contemporary law scholars, law is to forbid that which causes
harm to others. Relatively few people today have actually read John
Stuart Mill. But his perspective holds sway. In On Liberty he
asserts:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle,
as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with
the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether
the means used be physical force in the form of legal
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That
principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
52. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 52.
894 [Vol. 62
PATRICK H. MARTIN
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating
him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil
in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from
which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce
evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself,
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.53
Modem libertarians seem to take as a natural corollary of Mill's
proposition of individual sovereignty that society may not prohibit
those things that people do together through consent. The basis for
all this is the underlying concept that all notions of right and wrong
(of "ought"), except as it pertains to harm to others, have existence
only in the affections, though perhaps Mill himself never intended
such a conclusion. In After Virtue, Alasdair Maclntyre has observed
that today "all moral judgments are nothing but expression of
preference, expressions of attitudes or feelings."54 Voegelin's The
Nature of Law preceded many of the legal developments that reflect
this rather widely held view of moral judgments, but we may with
confidence surmise what his reaction would have been. The editors'
introduction observes: "The Nature of the Law may be characterized
as a reasoned invitation to restore holiness to the legal order."
IV. CONCLUSION
The profound difference between Voegelin (and many other
adherents to the natural law tradition) and the positivists is the view
of the nature of man and his place in nature. The argument over the
nature of law is an argument over the nature of man and whether man
has a place in an ordered creation that distinguishes him from a cow
or a cockroach. For Voegelin, law is part of an order that permits and
guides the fulfillment of human potential, both rational and spiritual.
For that order to have temporal efficacy, it must work through human
53. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays 13-14 (John Gray ed.,
1991).
54. Alisdair Maclntyre, After Virtue 12 (2d ed. 1984).
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instruments, including positive law. The philosopher's special role
is in developing the standards from the true order by which the
empirical law can be measured. Those of us who teach legal
philosophy may find much to admire in Voegelin's belief that we
philosophers are as much lawgivers as those in the legislature or on
the bench.
The philosophers develop projects of order that they do not:
expect to be enacted as valid rules through the lawmaking
process of their society. The work is done when the dialogue
or treatise is written; the projection of the true order is
finished. If conditions should arise historically under which
such an order could be enacted by an empirical society, all the
better, though neither Plato nor Aristotle expects to see these
conditions fulfilled. The philosopher, thus, becomes the
lawmaker of the true order in his own right, rivalling the
lawmaker of the empirical society with its order of dubious
truth."
According to Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle were unsuccessful, as
their own societies disintegrated around them, even as Voegelin saw
society disintegrate around himself. The philosopher is a Promethean
figure, the bringer of Order, who finds himselfrej ected by society and
in the end rather solitary: "The true order of society is living reality
in the well-ordered soul of the philosopher, brought to sharp
consciousness by the philosopher's refusal to succumb to the disorder
of his environment."56 One calls to mind another figure engaged in
heroic struggle, Hamlet, no doubt reflecting the contemplative
frustration of his creator:
What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how
infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and
admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how
like a god! the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!
And yet to me what is this quintessence of dust?57
55. Voegelin, supra note 15, at 53.
56. Id. at 52.
57. William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 2, sc. 2.
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